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ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AND THE METAPHYSICS OF AQUINAS
Tom Green
I. Introduction
The endeavour of the theologian is to discover the meaning of the utterances of divine revelation. But, "keeping his eye fixed upon his own goal, he must additionally take into consideration everything else he knows about the subject under discussion".
1 For his subject extends to the whole created order, and there are many human sciences which assist in this knowledge. Metaphysics, above all these human sciences, aims to articulate the reasons why of reality as a whole, giving voice about things as they are. Therefore, it can be seen that the disciplines of theology and metaphysics have the same subject. When Aquinas, the theologian, begins then, to give a rational account of his Christian faith, he does not err in using his theological beliefs as a platform to his philosophical demonstrations.
This essay, more than anything, is an attempt to determine the credibility of Thomas
Aquinas' metaphysics, particularly as presented in the Summa Theologiae. Therein, Aquinas argues that the existence of God must be demonstrated rationally, but he does so on the presupposition that his Christian faith is true. Hence, I will begin by giving an overview of his arguments concerning how humans acquire knowledge generally, for this will help us to see how metaphysical knowledge is possible at all. Then, I will demonstrate how he thinks we can come to know that God, the principle subject of metaphysics, exists. On this basis, I will argue that Aquinas presupposes the existence of God and why that does not discredit him.
II. Human Knowledge and the Possibility of Metaphysics
As a way of proceeding, we shall outline what Aquinas argues regarding human knowledge in general. In this way, we shall see how metaphysical knowledge is possible in his philosophical system. Human beings are composites of body and soul. Thus, a human being apprehends sensible objects through its sense organs as a composite. to humans and therefore cannot be grasped wholly and essentially by that which is inferior.
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In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas affirms the approach of many natural theologians who spoke of God in the via negativa -by way of negating of God the things which are more properly human. 11 For example, to say 'God is infinite', simply means to say, 'God is not finite'. Or, when we refer to God as immutable, we are not attributing any positive content to the nature of God, but only that he is not changing. We see that humans change, and they do so as beings moving from potency to act, but God is Pure Act and so there is in Him no change. 
III. Coming to Know God
Arriving at the possibility of knowing God is just the start. in which a thing may be self-evident: "in itself, though not to us [and] in itself, and to us".
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Propositions are self-evident if their predicate is contained in the essence of the subject, as in the proposition, "water is wet". Thus, for those who know the predicate and the subject, this kind of statement will be self-evident. But if the predicate or the subject are unknown to someone, then the statement will be self-evident in itself, but not to one who lacks that knowledge. In this sense, the proposition, "God exists" is self-evident in itself, for the predicate is contained in the essence of the subject (that is, God's essence is his existence, as Aquinas goes on to argue), but it is not self-evident to us for we do not know the essence of God. 20 In
Aquinas' reply to the type of objection Plantinga raises, he points out that, though man is naturally capable of knowledge of the divine, this does not mean that we are able absolutely to know He exists, "just as to know someone is approaching, is not the same as to know Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching". 21 We might have made a lucky guess to say that God exists from gazing into the starry heavens, but we do not know it absolutely.
How then do we know that God exists?
The proposition, 'God exists', "needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature-namely, by effects".
[italics mine] A demonstration
is performed in one of two ways: either through the cause or through the effect. 
IV. The Crucial Presupposition
If we have paid due attention to the chain of Thomas' arguments presented here, we will notice something peculiar to his philosophical method. Of particular note is the argument expressed in the preceding paragraph wherein he states that the existence of God ought to be demonstrated and how so. We demonstrate God's existence, says Aquinas, by arguing from what is better known to us to what is less known to us; by arguing from the effect, the existence of the cause. 25 But a cause is prior to its effect. So, in performing a demonstration of this kind, the philosopher presupposes the existence of the cause about which he makes his conclusion.
Aquinas does not shy away from such an admission, for he himself quotes St Paul saying, "for the invisible things of [God] , from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; his eternal power also, and divinity" (Rom 1:20 an account of deriving metaphysical knowledge which presupposes the existence of the causes, the Cause, about which he wants to draw conclusions.
How problematic is this to metaphysics? Ought we not presume rather the oppositethat God does not exist, or at least that we do not know whether there is a first cause? When
Aristotle considers the science which is to be the first among the sciences, he remarks pertinently that "if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to it to consider being qua being-both what it is and the attributes that belong to it qua being". Thomas Aquinas, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 149-150. with everything he says, but it is hardly reasonable to do away with his whole endeavour based on the point from which he starts. One would need first to demonstrate the incompatibilities of the two movements to truth. Aquinas demonstrates the opposite.
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V. Conclusion
Thomas Aquinas presents in his seminal work, the Summa Theologica, a grand scheme of reality as a whole and the place of man within it. More specifically, he shows how man is able to know things, to know the world around him and thus to engage with it and within it.
But he also demonstrates that there is a possibility of knowing things above his nature, of knowing the metaphysical, of knowing God. And while his demonstration may depend on the presupposition that God exists, this does not have a deleterious effect on his philosophical enterprise. For when we consider reality as a whole in metaphysics, the only thing that separates us from the theologian is our point of view. For both try to give a holistic account of the world and man's place therein. Aquinas demonstrates laudably the harmony of both; that what God has revealed about Himself and the world is a good starting point for man to begin to wonder.
33 Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991) , 151
